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Chinese Translations of Pratyakṣa1 
Funayama Toru 
The theory of direct perception was one of the most fundamental topics 
in Buddhist epistemology. It became more important particularly with 
Dignāga (ca. 480-540 C.E.), who advocated the ground-breaking theory of 
pramāṇa (lit. “measure”, “scale”, or “standard”) or the “means of valid 
cognition”. As is well known, pratyakṣa (“direct perception”) and anu-
māna (“inference”) constitute the two most important elements of this 
theory.  
It was Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602-664) who laid the foundation for the 
study of pramāṇa in China. In the Chinese context this study was called 
yinming (因明, “science of logic”, *hetuvidyā), which is often counted as 
one of five sciences (Skt. pañcavidyā, Ch. wuming 五明), by contrast to 
pramāṇavāda (“the theory of pramāṇa”) which belongs to the Sautrāntika 
and/or the Yocācāra position in Buddhist logic and epistemology.2 Al-
though Xuanzang was not the first person to bring Dignāga’s views to 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Eric Greene and Dr. Michael Radich for polishing 
my English. I am also profoundly grateful to all those who gave me invaluable sugges-
tions and comments on the first draft of this paper, which I read at National Chengchi 
University, Taipei, on March 27, 2010. My special thanks go to Dr. Ho Chien-hsing and 
Dr. Dan Lusthaus, who gave me important comments on some problems and errors in 
an earlier draft of this paper. Needless to say, however, all remaining errors are my own 
responsibility. 
2 Pramāṇa theory places equal emphasis on epistemology and logic, whereas the notion of 
yinming tends much more to emphasize the latter. In this sense, yinming is not the best 
word for the genre, insofar as it includes the theory of perception. 
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China,3 it was with him that study of this topic in China began in ear-
nest. 
Xuanzang translated pratyakṣa as xianliang (現量). In this paper I 
would like to consider the historical situation before and after Xuan-
zang’s adoption of this translation. The first half of this paper will be 
spent examining earlier appearances of the term in question, before 
Xuanzang’s time. As I will show, this topic is important for at least two 
reasons. First, the term xianliang is, strictly speaking, not a literal trans-
lation of pratyakṣa, despite Xuanzang’s general tendency to give fully 
literal translations. Second, it is not yet clear who first used this term. It 
is clear, however, that Xuanzang was not the first person. In the second 
half of this paper, I will shift to the post-Xuanzang period, paying special 
attention to some Chinese interpretations of xianliang. Developments in 
this period are possibly related to the process of the “sinification of Bud-
dhism”, in the sense that Chinese works during the Tang and Ming 
dynasties showed some serious discrepancies from the Indian Buddhist 
tradition, and began to develop peculiar Chinese interpretations of this 
word.  
1   Xianliang as translation 
I will begin with some observations about Xuanzang’s usage of xianliang. 
This term is used in some important translations by Xuanzang, such as 
the Yinming zhengli men lun (因明正理門論, Nyāyamukha of Dignāga), the 
Yinming ru zhengli lun (因明入正理論, Nyāyapraveśa[ka] of Śaṅkarasvā-
min) and the Apidamo jushe lun (阿毘達磨倶舍論, Abhidharmakośa[bhā-
ṣya] of Vasubandhu), in which xianliang is obviously used as a translation 
of pratyakṣa. For example, Dignāga’s well-known definition of direct per-
ception, viz., pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham (“Direct perception is free from 
conceptual construction”), is rendered by Xuanzang as xianliang chu fen-
bie (現量除分別).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
3 Prior to Xuanzang, the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha had already translated Dignāga’s 
epistemological text entitled Ālambanaparīkṣā (“An Examination of Epistemic Objects”), 
under the title Wuxiang sichen lun (無相思塵論, T1619). For a discussion of this issue, see 
Funayama, 2010: 147.  
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Modern readers of Xuanzang’s translations generally take xianliang as 
an unproblematic translation of pratyakṣa. Strictly speaking, however, 
the term xianliang is not a literal translation, because liang (量), which 
literally means “measure”, “measurement”, “scale”, or “amount/quan-
tity”, as either a verb or a noun, corresponds to pramāṇa. According to 
the Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya compiled by Hirakawa et al., the 
word pratyakṣa corresponds in some of Xuanzang’s texts to other Chinese 
terms as well: e.g., xianjian (現見).4 The Xianyang shengjiao lun (顯揚聖教
論), one of Xuanzang’s earliest translations, is consistent in the usage of 
xianliang for pratyakṣa. On the other hand, yet another important text, 
the Yuqie shi di lun (瑜伽師地論, Yogācārabhūmi), the search for which 
inspired Xuanzang’s journey to India, occasionally has xian (現) and xian-
zheng liang (現證量) as translations of pratyakṣa, although in many cases 
it prefers xianliang.5 These examples show that for Xuanzang, though 
xianliang was certainly a well-established translation of pratyakṣa, it was 
not necessarily the only Chinese translation, as modern scholars often 
assume. 
The matter of wording with or without liang, per se, is not at all a seri-
ous problem, but it is interesting to imagine why Xuanzang might have 
wanted to add it to his translation of pratyakṣa. As a rigorous Sanskritist, 
Xuanzang by and large preferred literal translation; he did not like add-
ing words and thereby embellishing the meaning of the original term. In 
this sense, it is worthwhile to ask whether xianliang was a translation 
newly created by Xuanzang himself. As it turns out, it was not. There are 
some noteworthy examples of xianliang before Xuanzang’s time.  
Before Xuanzang came back from India, Prabhākaramitra (波羅頗蜜
多羅, 565-633, also called 波羅頗迦羅蜜多羅) had employed xianliang 
(現量) and yanliang (驗量) for pratyakṣa and anumāna, respectively, in his 
-------------------------------------------------- 
4 Hirakawa et al., 1973: 251 pratyakṣa, q.v. Note also that the same term is even used in yet 
other forms (e.g., neng xian liaoda 能現了達, xianzhao 現照), especially when it means 
not direct perception as one of the two/three pramāṇas, but direct experience in the 
broader sense.  
5 Yokoyama/Hirosawa, 1996: 264 (xian 現), 266 (xianjian 現見), 268 (xianzhengliang 現證
量), and 272 (xianliang 現量).  
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translation of Bhāviveka’s commentary, Prajñāpradīpa, on the Middle Trea-
tise.6  
Even prior to this time, at the end of the sixth century, members of 
the Dilun (地論) school had already used the term. A typical example is 
found in Jingying Huiyuan’s (淨影寺慧遠 , 523-592) doxographical 
compendium entitled Dasheng yi zhang (大乘義章). Huiyuan summarizes 
the theory of the threefold classification of pramāṇa as follows: 
First, the Exposition of Names [as follows:] The doctrine of the three 
measurements [of valid cognition] comes from the Saṃdhinir-
mocana-sūtra. When the mind of wisdom grasps entities, each has its 
own portion. Therefore it is called “measurement” [or “amount”]. 
There are manifold ways of distinguishing [types of] “measurement”: 
one says that there are three: first, direct measurement; second, mea-




It is clear here how Huiyuan understands xianliang. Further, the term 
fenxian 分限, which appears here in the explanation of liang, is also 
interesting, because fenxian means “portion” or “amount”, which re-
minds us more of Sanskrit words like parimāṇa, rather than pramāṇa. At 
least, it seems true that by liang Huiyuan took the term to mean “mea-
sure” in the broad sense, and not specifically “a means of valid cogni-
tion”, as it was defined in later texts composed by Dignāga and his fol-
lowers. 
Moreover, members of the Dilun school used xianliang in other texts 
too. For example, the Dunhuang manuscript S.613v mentions, as a Dilun 
theory, a fourfold classification of pramāṇa: xianliang (現量), biliang (比
量), xinyanliang (信言量), and jiaoliang (教量).7 Further, in the above 
-------------------------------------------------- 
6 See the Bore deng lun shi (般若燈論釋 12, T30:1566.111b-c). Yanliang, appearing four 
times in the text, is a rare translation, probably for anumāna. It is not used elsewhere.  
7 See Funayama, 2000: 145. The fourfold theory of pramāṇa is mentioned in S.613v as a 
theory upheld by those within the Buddhist fold, viz., the Dilun themselves. This 
enumeration is undoubtedly different from the four kinds claimed by the Nyāya school 
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quotation, Huiyuan refers to the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, but this sūtra’s 
wording is not the same as his. Guṇabhadra’s (求那跋陀羅, 394-468) 
translation has xianqian (現前) for *pratyakṣa (Tib. mṅon sum) and xianqian 
liang (現前量) for *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam (Tib. mṅon sum gyi tshad ma).8 
Bodhiruci’s (菩提流[/留]支, d. 527) translation, on the other hand, has 
xianqianjian (現前見) and xianjian (現見) for pratyakṣa.9 
Returning to Xuanzang, we may assume that his use of xianliang was 
influenced by the preceding scholastic tradition, as found in Huiyuan’s 
compendium, and also in Prabhākaramitra’s translation.  
Here a question arises. Though it is evident that the Dilun employed 
the term xianliang in their writings, what kind of textual basis did they 
have in translated texts? This is an interesting question because, as 
stated just above, in spite of Huiyuan’s explicit reference to the Saṃdhi-
nirmocana-sūtra as the source for the theory of the threefold classi-
fication, neither Guṇabhadra’s nor Bodhiruci’s translations have xian-
-------------------------------------------------- 
(i.e., pratyakṣa “direct perception”, anumāna “inference”, āptavacana (or āgama) “words 
of a reliable person”, and upamāna “analogy”). It is a peculiarity of the Dilun fourfold 
classification that they distinguish xinyanliang and jiaoliang, which are usually regarded 
as identical. This view is criticized even within the Dilun School. See Dasheng yi zhang 10 
(T44:1851.671b4-6; pointed out in Funayama, op. cit.: 153 n. 39). According to Aoki 
Takashi (Aoki, 2000: 194, 198-201), the date of S.613v is around 560 or later. As pointed 
out in Funayama, op. cit., the Dilun classification of pramāṇa into these four kinds is also 
found in S.4303, another important Dilun text, which was, according to Aoki (loc., cit.), 
composed later than S.613v and before ca. 585 CE.  
8 Guṇabhadra: 一切行無常，一切行苦，一切法無我，若世間現前得，如是等名現前
得相 (T16:679.719a14-16). Tib: de la ’du byed thams cad mi rtag pa ñid daṅ | ’du byed thams 
cad sdug bsṅal ba ñid daṅ | chos thams cad bdag med pa ñid ’jig rten na mṅon sum du dmigs pa 
daṅ | de lta bu daṅ mthun pa gaṅ yin pa de ni de mṅon sum su dmigs pa’i mtshan ñid yin no || 
(Lamotte, 1935: 156). Cf. Xuanzang: 一切行皆無常性，一切行皆是苦性，一切法皆無
我性，此為世間現量所得 (T16:676.709b25-26). 
Guṇabhadra: 若此助成如是現前量比量信言量，是名五種快淨相 (T16:679.719b5-6). 
Tib: de ltar ’thad pa’i sgrub par pa’i rigs pa de ni mṅon sum gyi tshad ma daṅ | rjes su dpag pa’i 
tshad ma daṅ | yid ches pa’i luṅ gi tshad mas mtshan ñid lṅa po dag gis yoṅs su dag pa yin no || 
(Lamotte, 1935: 157). Cf. Xuanzang: 如是證成道理，由現量故，由比量故，由聖教量
故。由五種相，名為清淨 (T16:676.709c28-710a1).  
9 Bodhiruci: 一切有為行無常，一切有為行苦，一切法無我，世間現前見法，如是等
是名彼現前見相 (T16:675.686b7-8); 此依生成相應，現見相應，量相應，比智相應，
聖人説法相應，知五種相，是名清淨相 (686c2-4). See also the previous note. 
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liang.10 Therefore, it is still unclear at this juncture what source Huiyuan 
drew upon in employing xianliang. In what follows, I will try to survey 
translations of pratyakṣa in the Six Dynasties period.  
The earliest texts in which I have identified translations of pratyakṣa 
and pramāṇa are attributed to Kumārajīva. Investigation into the ques-
tion of whether there exist any earlier translations than Kumārajīva will 
be a task for future research. 
(a) Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, ca. 350-409) – xin (信) or kexin (可信) for 
*pramāṇa; xianshi (現事) or xianzai (現在) for *pratyakṣa 




《成實論》 8: 有三種信。見名現在信。聞名信賢聖語。知名比知… 
(T32:1646.304a7-8). 
(b) Tanwuchen (曇無讖, 385-433) – xianzhi (現智) for pratyakṣa12 
《菩薩地持經》 1, 真實義品: 云何學所知真實義耶。如世智人依
現智比智及從師聞思量修學，彼決定智所行處事，結集建立。是名
學所知真實義也 (T30:1581.893a1-3). 
Bodhisattvabhūmi, Tattvārthapaṭala (Wogihara, 1936: 37, 22-38, 1; Dutt, 
1966: 25, 17-21): yuktiprasiddhatvaṃ katamat. satāṃ yuktārthapaṇḍitā-
nāṃ vicakṣaṇānāṃ tārkikāṇāṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ tarkaparyāpannāyāṃ bhū-
mau sthitānāṃ svayaṃ pratibhānikyāṃ pārthagjanikyāṃ mīmāṃsānucari-
tāyāṃ pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamaṃ pramāṇaṃ niścitya suviditasuvi-
niścitajñānagocarajñeyeyaṃ [D: suviniścitajñānagocaro jñeyeyaṃ W] vastū-
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 No corresponding section exists in Paramārtha’s translation, Jie jie jing (解節經, T677). 
11 This is a reference to a non-Buddhist view, most probably of the Nyāya school. See also 
n. 7 above. 
12 The Chinese word for pramāṇa is not clear in Tanwuchen’s translation. This is probably 
because the translator was not aware of the significance of pramāṇa, as he flourished 
before the pramāṇa theory became popular.  
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papattisādhanayuktyā prasādhitaṃ vyavasthāpitam, idam ucyate yuktipra-
siddhaṃ tattvam. 





Cf. 求那跋摩 (367-431) 譯《菩薩善戒經》2: 云何名方便流布。如
世智人先以籌量，然後造作經書論義，是名方便流布 (T30:1582.
968b7-9).  
《菩薩地持經》 3, 力種性品: 現智比智，從師具聞而為人説，非
不思量13 (T30:1581.904c23-24). 
Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara, 1936: 106, 24-25; Dutt, 1966: 75, 10-11): 
pratyakṣānumānāptāgamayuktāṃ ca kathāṃ karoti, nāpramāṇayuktām. 
Cf. 玄奘譯《瑜伽師地論》38, 菩薩地力種姓品: 又依現比至教道理
而説正法，非不依彼三量道理 (T30:1579.503b10-11). 
No corresponding passage exists in Guṇavarman’s translation (cf. T30:
1566.78c).  
(c) Guṇabhadra (求那跋陀羅, 394-468) – xianqian (現前) for *pratyakṣa; 
xianqianliang (現前量) for *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. See the above 
paragraph.14  




13 Fei bu si liang (非不思量) is a problematic translation of nāpramāṇayukta-. It seems that 
the translator took pramāṇa to mean “to measure, estimate” as a verb.  
14 For the original passage (T16:679.719b5-6) of Guṇabhadra’s translation, see n. 8 above.  
15 According to the Chu sanzang ji ji (出三藏記集) 2 (T55:2145.13b6-12), the Fangbian xin 
lun was translated in the second year of Yanxing (延興, viz., 472 CE). The Sanskrit 
underlying this name is not clear to me.  




(e) Bodhiruci (菩提流[/留]支, d. 527) – xin (信) for pramāṇa; xianjian 
(現見) for pratyakṣa; xianxin (現信) for pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam 
《唯識論》: 問曰。依信説有。信者有四種。一者現見，二者比知，
三者譬喩，四者阿含。此諸信中，現信最勝 (T31:1588.68b25-27). 
See also (f) Paramārtha’s translation of the same text below. 
(f) Paramārtha (真諦, 499-569, also called Kulanātha 拘羅那他) – 
liang (量) for pramāṇa; zheng (證) or zhengliang (證量) for pratyakṣa; 
zhengliang (證量) for pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam16 
《大乘唯識論》: 一切量中，證量最勝 (T31:1589.72c22-23). 
Viṃśikā/Viṃśatikā:17 sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ ga-
riṣṭham iti (Lévi, 1925: 8.23). 
Cf. 玄奘譯《唯識二十論》: 一切量中，現量為勝 (T31:1590.76b15-16).  
Thus, it is clear that none of the translators above uses xianliang as the 
translation of pratyakṣa. Among the translations we do encounter in 
these texts, Paramārtha’s term zhengliang (證量) is peculiar. It translates 
either pratyakṣa or pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, in which zheng signifies “some-
thing vivid, clear or direct”.18 As mentioned above, this wording is some-
-------------------------------------------------- 
16 Paramārtha’s translation also contains zhengliang as a translation of pratyakṣa. See 
Hirakawa et al., 1977: 255, 證 <…>量 , q.v. Further, the Foxing lun (佛性論 ) 1 
(T31:1610.790b28-c4, 791a-c, 793a5-6, b27-c1) has examples of nengliang (能量, for 
*pramāṇa), suoliang (所量, for *prameya), zhengliang (證量, for *pratyakṣa), biliang (比量, 
for *anumāna as a noun, “inference”), bizhi (比知, “to infer”), and shengyan[liang] (聖言
[量], for *āgama).  
17 On the basis of a careful examination of earlier manuscripts, Kano Kazuo (Kano, 2008: 
esp. 345 and 350) has recently proposed the new form Viṃśikā as a preferable title for 
the text otherwise known as Viṃśatikā.  
18 According to Hirakawa et al., 1977: 254 證 , q.v., zheng is sometimes used as a 
translation of Skt. sākṣāt-kṛ “to operate or function directly”, in both Paramārtha’s and 
Xuanzang’s translation of the Abhidharmakośa. Further, zheng in this context signifies a 
direct cognition of an object (sākṣātkārijñāna) as belonging to direct perception (praty-
akṣa), and has nothing to do with inference (anumāna) or logical demonstration (sādha-
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times, though not very often, found even in Xuanzang’s translation of 
the Yogācārabhūmi, in the form of xianzheng liang (現證量).19  
There is, however, a text in which the term xianliang does appear as a 
translation – the Huizheng lun (迴諍論) or Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna. 
According to the Translation Record attached to the head of the trans-
lation (T32:1631.13b11-21), the Chinese translation was made in the third 
year of Xinghe 興和 of the Eastern Wei dynasty, i.e. 541 CE. The trans-
lators were Pimuzhixian 毘目智仙20 and Qutan liuzhi 瞿曇流支 (alias 
Prajñāruci 般若流支). The relevant section is as follows, shown together 
with the corresponding Sanskrit text:  
(g) 《迴諍論》: 又復有義。偈言: 
     若彼現是有，汝可得有迴。 







     説現比阿含 譬喩等四量 





na) as conducted on the basis of conceptual cognition (vikalpa, kalpanā, Ch. fenbie 分
別).  
19 Further, there is an example of xianzheng (現證, “to attain a thing vividly or directly”) 
as a translation of pratyakṣatām eti (lit. “it goes to the condition of direct perception”) 
in Xuanzang’s translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (She dasheng lun ben 攝大乘論本, 
T31:1594.143c14). See Nagao, 1987: 92-93. According to Sasaki Gesshō (Sasaki, 1931: 60), 
the same Skt. term is translated zhengzheng (正證) in Gupta’s (笈多 = Dharmagupta, d. 
619) translation, zheng (證) in Paramārtha’s translation, and xianyi (現意) in Bud-
dhaśānta’s (佛陀扇多, d.u., fl. ca. 525-539?) translation.  
20 The Sanskrit underlying this name is not clear to me.  
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 pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān | 
 tan nāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante || [5] 
yadi pratyakṣataḥ sarvabhāvān upalabhya bhavān nivartayati – śūnyāḥ sar-
vabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam. kasmāt. pratyakṣam api hi pramāṇaṃ sva-
bhāvāntargatatvāc chūnyam. yo ’pi sarvabhāvān upalabhate so ’pi śūnyaḥ. 
tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena nopalambhabhāvaḥ. anupalabdhasya ca 
pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ - śūnyaḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam. 
syāt te buddhir anumānenāgamenopamānena vā sarvabhāvān upalabhya 
sarvabhāvavyāvartanaṃ kriyata iti. atra brūmaḥ.  
 anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣeṇāgamopamāne ca | 
 anumānāgamasādhyā ye ’rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ca || [6] 
anumānam apy upamānāgamāś ca21 pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena pratyuktāḥ. 
yathā hi pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ śūnyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt… (Yo-
nezawa, 2008: 228, 230 with stylistic modification by FT). 
Here, it is evident that xianliang (現量) appears as the translation of pra-
tyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, and not pratyakṣa. This distinction is obvious because 
pratyakṣa is translated as xian (現).  
As far as I know, the Huizheng lun is the only translation text prior to 
Huiyuan which employs xianliang. However, the exact reason for the 
Dilun school’s preference for the term xianliang is still not entirely clear, 
because the Huizheng lun is not a major text for the Dilun school, and it is 
scarcely cited in Dilun compositions. In any case, I find it interesting that 
even though the actual usage of xianliang is rather limited in translations, 
the Dilun school preferred it over other options, and that it was then 
adopted even by Xuanzang, in spite of the fact that the element liang is 
superfluous as a literal translation of pratyakṣa. In fact, the use of this 
term meant that Xuanzang could not distinguish between pratyakṣa and 
pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam in his translation, since both are translated in the 
same way as xianliang. This is certainly a small point, but I think it is 
noteworthy when we take into account the generally rigorous character 
of Xuanzang’s translations.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
21 The wording anumānam apy upamānāgamāś ca is grammatically incorrect. Johnston/
Kunst, 1986: 46 reads anumānopamānāgamāś ca.  
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In ending this first section, I would like finally to refer to the usage of 
xian liang in Guṇabhadra’s translation of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (Lengqie 
jing 楞伽經, T670). In fact, we find that the phrase zixin xian liang (自心
現量) appears forty times in the Lengqie jing. In addition to this, a similar 
expression, zixin xian (自心現, without liang), also appears many times in 
the same text. When we compare Guṇabhadra’s translation with the 
extant Skt. text, we can identify zixin xian liang with svacitta-dṛśya-mātra, 
which means “nothing but what is experienced by one’s own mind”.22 
That is, xian liang is not a single term in this case; xian signifies “to appear, 
manifest itself” and liang is a translation of mātra “merely, only, nothing 
but”, often rendered in other translations as wei (唯).  
The usage of xian liang in the following passage from the Chinese 
Laṅkāvatāra is also noteworthy in connection with pramāṇa theory: 
O Mahāmati! The Nirvāṇa that I teach means the following: one un-
derstands with one’s superior awareness what is none other than the 
manifestation of one’s mind. (Note: Measurement is of four kinds: one, 
direct perception; two, inferential understanding; three, analogy; and 
four, what is transmitted by distinguished predecessors. All those 
non-Buddhists [mentioned previously in the sūtra] are not trustwor-
thy on [the topic of] the four [types of] mensuration.) One does not 
become attached to the external nature [of ontic entities]; is free from 
[denial by the method of] the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi); perceives the 
condition of what exists in accordance with reality, without falling 
into the two delusory extremes manifested by one’s own mind, so 
that neither cognizer nor cognized is apprehended; and the non-
perception of all [types of] mensuration is accomplished. When one is 
ignorant of true reality, one is not able to apprehend [it] at all. When 
one discards [the above-stated erroneous condition of mind], one 
attains the truth of self-awakened sages; understands the two kinds of 
no-self; transcends the two kinds of affliction; purifies the two obstac-
les and removes them; and becomes eternally free from the two 
-------------------------------------------------- 
22 The meaning of liang in the case of zixin xian liang in the text in question has already 
been pointed out in previous studies, such as Takasaki, 1980: 128 and 287; Nakamura, 
1975: 1428a; and Yanagi, 2011: 77. 
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deaths. [Being equipped with] numerous kinds of profound samādhi 
such as the shadow-and-illusion-like [samādhi that are acquired in] 
higher and higher grounds (or stages, bhūmi) [of bodhisattvas and the 
final] ground of the Thus Come One, one becomes entirely free from 
mind (citta), mentation (manas) and mental consciousness (mano-








T16:670.505a8-15; underlining and index numbers [1]-[8] added by FT 
for convenience.) 
There is an interlinear note (shown by the angle brackets: 〈…〉) after 
zixin xian liang (自心現量)[2].26 This note is a reference to a fourfold clas-
sification of pramāṇa (liang 量[3]) which is most probably maintained by 
-------------------------------------------------- 
23 This is a tentative translation of the Chinese translation, which is not exactly the same 
as the Sanskrit text. A closer examination, as well as a comparison of the Sanskrit and 
the Chinese versions, must await future research. 
24 I take the variant duo (堕) in the “Gong (宮, Palace)” edition (i.e., the Kaiyuan si 開元
寺 edition, alias the Pilu dazang jing 毘盧大藏經), which fits āpatana in Skt. The 
Korean edition (i.e., both the first and the second editions) has sui (隨).  









26 According to a footnote to T670 in the Taisho edition p. 505, the Ming edition (i.e., the 
Jiaxing 嘉興 Canon) omits this interlinear note. 
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the Nyāya school.27 First of all, I do not find any strong reason to regard 
this note as a later interpolation. In other words, in my view, this is 
probably a kind of commentary added by the translators themselves, i.e., 
Guṇabhadra et al.28 In this case, a question will naturally follow: Did the 
translators mistake zixin xian liang “what is none other than the mani-
festation of one’s mind” for “direct perception of one’s own mind”? To 
this question, my answer is definitely, “No.” We should not confuse the 
meanings of the two occurrences of the character liang, i.e., liang for Skt. 
mātra in the translation and the four kinds of liang for pramāṇa in the 
interlinear note.  
This passage corresponds to the following Sanskrit passage, though 
the two are not entirely identical:29 





27 Namely, xianjian (現見) for pratyakṣa, bizhi (比知) for anumāna, piyu (譬喩) for upamāna, 
and xiansheng xiangchuan (先勝相傳) for āptavacana, respectively. The interlinear note 
clearly says that these four kinds of “measurement” represent a theory promulgated 
by non-Buddhists (waidao 外道). 
28 Guṇabhadra’s translation of the Laṅkāvatāra also has other interlinear notes, some of 
which reveal that the person(s) who wrote them had knowledge of the Sanskrit text. 
For example, a note at T16:670.483b17-18 on the word xin (心) in the term diyi yi xin (第
一義心) distinguishes two Skt. words for Ch. xin, i.e., ganlida (肝栗大, for Skt. hṛdaya, 
lit. “heart”) and zhiduo (質多, for Skt. citta, lit. “mind”), and clearly states that the 
word xin corresponds to hṛdaya in Sanskrit. This indication coincides with the reading 
in the extant Skt. text. It would be natural, in light of this evidence, to consider such 
comments as due to the translator(s); and this is to say nothing of a more general 
tendency, whereby such interlinear notes are usually due to the translator(s) in any 
case.  
29 No equivalent for Chinese passage [1] exists in the Sanskrit text. The Chinese 
translation has ru wo suoshuo niepan zhe[1] wei (如我所説涅槃者[1]謂). Further, the 
Sanskrit expression “nirvāṇam kalpayanti” and the Chinese expression shuo ming niepan 
(説名涅槃) are not identical. Otherwise, the wording in the Sanskrit and Chinese texts 
basically corresponds. 
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śanāt[8]30 tattvasya vyāmohakatvād agrahaṇaṃ tattvasya, tadvyudāsāt sva-
pratyātmāryadharmādhigamān nairātmyadvayāvabodhāt kleśadvayavini-
vṛtter āvaraṇadvayaviśuddhatvād bhūmyuttarottaratathāgatabhūmimāyā-
diviśvasamādhicittamanomanovijñānavyāvṛtter nirvāṇaṃ kalpayanti (Vai-
dya, 1963: 75.3-8; cf. Nanjio, 1923: 184.15-185.6. The index numbers [2], 
[6], [7] and [8] correspond to the same index numbers in the above 
Chinese translation). 
Obviously svacittadṛśyamātra- is translated as zixin xian liang in Chinese, 
and there is no note in Skt. I direct the reader’s attention to the term 
pramāṇa (Index Number [7]) which is translated as duliang (度量) in 
Chinese. The context reveals that pramāṇa here clearly signifies a foil 
theory of pramāṇa (which the author will ultimately reject). The Chinese 
wording bujian suocheng (不見所成[8] in the translation) and xijie bu cheng 
ye (悉皆不成[5]也 in the note) also seems worthy of our attention. Both 
have the negative particle bu and the verb cheng. Taking it into consi-
deration that these appear after the reference to pramāṇa/liang, I think 
that the Chinese interlinear note is placed in the wrong position: it must 
be a brief commentary on the word pramāṇa (Index Number [7]), and not 
svacittadṛśyamātra. The mislocation of the note may also possibly be 
caused by the fact that the word liang appears twice in Chinese ([2] and 
[7]), as does the wording zixin xian/svacittadṛśya- ([2] and [6]). To sum up, 
in my view, in this passage of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, zixin xian liang has 
nothing to do with xianliang as pratyakṣa, though at first glance it appears 
that it does, because the interlinear note on the fourfold classification of 
pramāṇa was put in the wrong place.  
2   The sinification of the concept of xianliang 
So far we have examined earlier usages of xianliang and reached the fol-
lowing conclusions: that xianliang had already been used before Xuan-
zang in texts by the Dilun school; and that as a translation, xianliang cor-
responds to pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, and not to pratyakṣa in the strict sense. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
30 The exact meaning of the compound sarvapramāṇāgrahaṇāpravṛttidarśanāt is not clear 
to me.  
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In what follows, I would like to consider how this term was construed by 
Chinese scholar-monks, focusing on the “evolution” of their interpre-
tations.  
The Sanskrit word pratyakṣa is a compound which consists of two 
elements: prati- (“towards”, “in the vicinity of”, or “with regard to”) and 
akṣa (“the eye”, or “the sense organ” in the broad sense); hence pratyakṣa 
means either “perception” as a neuter compound noun pratyakṣam, signi-
fying a type of cognition (Skt. jñāna, vijñāna, etc.), or “perceptible” as an 
adjective, or even “that which is perceptible”, namely “the object of per-
ception” (in the form of nt. pratyakṣam, m. pratyakṣaḥ, or f. pratyakṣā). Of 
these two, the former case, viz., a neuter noun meaning a kind of cog-
nition, is predominant over the latter; the former usage as a neuter com-
pound noun is much more popular in many texts. In other words, it is a 
common, generic word for perception or the object of perception.  
In the context of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school (i.e., the Sautrāntika 
and/or Yogācāra), Dharmottara (ca. 740-800), in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā ad 
Nyāyabindu I 3, explicates direct perception as pratigatam āśritam akṣam 
(“that which depends on – namely is based on – the sense organ”). He al-
so states that the term can be taken as any gender (sarvaliṅgaḥ pratyakṣa-
śabdaḥ). In his commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, Durveka-
miśra explicitly states that akṣa here means the sense organ (akṣam indri-
yam).31 
In spite of its frequent use among modern Buddhist scholars, the 
Chinese term xianliang is a strange word. Once we have been informed 
that it is a translation of Skt. pratyakṣa, or that it means “perception” in 
English, we usually do not inquire any further. But in fact, as a Chinese 
word, the meaning of xianliang as it is remains totally unclear.32 One of 
the problems lies in the fact that it was created artificially, most prob-
ably for the purpose of translation, and no actual usage can be found in 
pre-Buddhist Chinese literature. Another difficulty for us in understan-
-------------------------------------------------- 
31 Malvania, 1955: 38-39. See also Hattori, 1968: 76-78 n. 1, 11; Sharma, 1985: 15, 20, and 
22; and Taber, 2005: 191 n. 71. 
32 It is very interesting to note in passing that the well-known fixed Tibetan translation 
of the same term, mṅon sum, is also not very clear regarding its etymology, though 
mṅon probably signifies mṅon par or mṅon du “clearly, evidently”. 
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ding the term is that both elements, xian and liang, each being a single 
graph, have various senses; for example, it is not entirely clear whether 
liang in this term is a verb or a noun, and in fact it can be used in both 
ways as a Chinese word, as we will see in some of the examples below. 
Moreover, the exact relationship between xian and liang is also not self-
evident.  
As indicated above, Xuanzang often employed the term as a single 
equivalent to pratyakṣa. Probably he had no difficulty in understanding 
the term himself, because he knew the meaning and the usages of praty-
akṣa in Sanskrit very well. However, the technical term xianliang started 
its own journey when Chinese scholar-monks began to comment on it.  
We start our examination from the pre-Xuanzang period. In his Da-
sheng yi zhang, Jingying Huiyuan of the Sui dynasty, one of the earliest 
scholars of Chinese pramāṇa theory, gives the meaning of xianliang as fol-
lows: 
What is called “direct measurement” [is the following]: Direct under-
standing (xianzhi 現知) of entities is termed “direct measurement”. 
Further, [another explanation is the following:] Understanding of 




Here, Huiyuan gives two different interpretations to the term. One is to 
take xian in the sense of xianzhi 現知, “to understand directly”, or alter-
natively, “to understand vividly”. The other is to understand xian in the 
sense of xianfa 現法, “present entities (dharmas)”. The former means 
that xian is an adverb (or alternatively, that xianzhi is a single verb), and 
the latter that it is an adjective. Giving two different meanings to a single 
notion looks ambiguous, but it is a typical working method in commen-
tarial literature to present as many interpretations as possible. Further, 
in this context, Huiyuan pays attention to xian only; he does not give any 
comment on liang. 
Another notable text which reports the meaning of xianliang is the She 
dasheng lun chao (攝大乘論抄, T2806). This text is a commentary on 
Vasubandhu’s She dasheng lun shi lun (攝大乘論釋, *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-
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bhāṣya, T1595) translated by Paramārtha. It belongs to what is called the 
Shelun (攝論) school. Although the exact date of the activity of the 
author of this text is not certain, it probably belongs to either the late 
Sui or the early Tang dynasty. This anonymous commentary has recently 
been re-edited by Ikeda Masanori. Consulting his new edition, let me 
refer to a line which gives the literal meaning of xianliang. It says: 
Names and Bodies (Essences) of the Three Measurements – [First,] 
Name(s). 1) Present (or Direct) Measurement. What ordinary and holy 
people cognize is neither [entities] in the past, nor in the future, 
[hence] it is termed “present”. “Measurement” (liang) means precisely 
“mensuration” (liangdu). [Thus the word xianliang] is so called in 
terms of the time of engagement... 
(三量名體。名。一現量。凡聖所知，事非過未，名現。量即量度。
從事時義為名… T85:2806.1003c20-21; Ikeda, 2009: 18.) 
It is remarkable that the author explicates the meaning of xian by saying 
that it refers to present entities to be cognized by ordinary and holy per-
sons, distinguishing them from past (guo 過) and future (wei 未) entities. 
This interpretation of xian as referring to the present object corresponds 
to the second of Huiyuan’s interpretations. The other element, liang, is 
defined as “mensuration” (liangdu 量度).  
Huiyuan and the author of the She dasheng lun chao were aware of the 
significance of the threefold classification of pramāṇa as found in Vasu-
bandhu’s texts. They were not, however, in any position to get access to 
the new theory of Dignāga, who opened up a new era of pramāṇa in 
Indian Buddhism; Dignāga’s views on pramāṇa were first translated into 
Chinese only later, by Xuanzang.  
Xuanzang’s translations of the Nyāyamukha and the Nyāyapraveśa, in 
particular, were the most important texts for East Asian studies of yin-
ming. Both the Nyāyamukha and the Nyāyapraveśa give the same etymo-
logy of pratyakṣa, that is: akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam, “Because 
it occurs in connection with each sense organ, it is (called) direct percep-
tion.” Xuanzang translated this passage, xian xian bie zhuan, gu ming xian-
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liang (現現別轉，故名現量).33 If we compare the Chinese translation 
with Sanskrit, we can safely conclude that xian (現) is a translation of 
akṣa.34 Namely, 
  xian  xian  bie  zhuan   gu ming  xianliang 
   現   現    別  轉   故 名 現量 
 akṣam  akṣam  prati  vartate  iti  φ  pratyakṣam 
It is evident that the expression xian xian is a translation of akṣam akṣam 
(that is, xian means akṣa), and that xianliang is used for pratyakṣa. On the 
other hand, as we have verified in “I. Xianliang as translation” above, in 
his translation of the Yogācārabhūmi, Xuanzang sometimes uses xian (and 
sometimes even xianjian) for pratyakṣa. Moreover, he also uses xianliang 
as a translation of pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam in his translation of the Twenty 
Stanzas.35 Here we encounter a somewhat confusing result of Xuanzang’s 
terminology: the word xian can be used for either akṣa or pratyakṣa and 
xianliang for either pratyakṣa or pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. Thus, in sum, 
Xuanzang translated Skt. pratyakṣa in two ways: as xian and xianliang. 
It seems to be the case that this ambiguity opened the way to a new 
phase of interpretation, which guided later scholars in the direction of 
philosophical developments different from those seen in Indian Bud-
dhism.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
33 T32:1630.12b29, T32:1628.3b17. See Katsura, 1982: 84; Funayama, 1992: 89 n. 182; and 
Taber, 2005: 191 n. 71. Taber also introduces some different views on the etymology of 
pratyakṣa in Brahmanical (Hindu) texts, such as Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasaṃ-
graha (which employs a similar, but slightly different wording, akṣam akṣaṃ pratītyot-
padyata iti pratyakṣam), Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya, and others. His elucidation is par-
tially based on Sharma, 1985. It is noteworthy that, according to Sharma, some gram-
matical authors, such as Haradatta (a commentator on the Kāśikāvṛtti), construe the 
meaning of prati in the sense not of akṣam akṣaṃ prati but akṣi akṣi prati, but others, 
such as Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra (all three authors belonging to 
the Nyāya school), prefer akṣa to akṣi. Among Buddhist authors, Sharma takes up Dhar-
mottara, but he does not mention Dignāga. 
34 In this context, the word akṣa metonymically signifies the sense organs in general, as I 
indicated above. It is interesting that Xuanzang translates akṣa as gen (根) in the Jushe 
lun (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya). See Hirakawa et al., 1973: 3 akṣa, q.v. 
35 See p. 40 above.  
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In his commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, Kuiji (窺基, alias Dashengji 
大乘基 or Ji 基, 632-682) gives an intricate explanation of the passage 
in question in terms of the fourfold classification of non-conceptual 
cognition (wushishen 五識身, wujuyi 五倶意, zhuzizheng 諸自證, and 
xiudingzhe 修定者) and five kinds of sensory cognition (pañca-vijñāna).36 
Further, in his commentary on the Viṃśikā/Viṃśatikā (The Twenty Stan-
zas), the same author gives a different type of elucidation in terms of 
differences between schools. According to him, there were at least eight 
ways of interpreting xianliang: the views of Vasumitra of the Sarvāsti-
vāda school; of Dharmatrāta of the same school; of Ghoṣa of the same 
school; of the Saṃmitīya/Saṃmatīya school; of the Sautrāntika school; of 
the non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools; and finally, of the 
Mahāyāna. In briefly introducing the gist of each idea, Kuiji even gives a 
formal analysis of xianliang as a compound, after the manner of Sanskrit 
grammar, using terminology such as “karmadhāraya compound” (chiye shi 
持業釋) and “tatpuruṣa compound” (yishi shi 依士釋, also called yizhu shi 
依主釋).37  
-------------------------------------------------- 












(T43:1834.999a11-24; translation omitted). This is Kuiji’s explanation of the word 
xianliang as it is used in the Twenty Stanzas in the form yiqie liang zhong, xianliang wei 
sheng (一切量中，現量為勝, T31:1590.76b15-16; Skt. sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ praty-
akṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ gariṣṭham iti). In other words, in this context, xianliang is used pri-
marily as a translation of pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. In the above commentary, it seems 
certain that Kuiji takes xian (現) in the sense of jian (見) and liang (量) in the sense of 
nengliang (能量, “to measure” as a verb). The critical point here is that Kuiji uses terms 
such as xian, liang, and xianliang as explanations of different views held in the Indian 
context by Vasumitra (Shiyou 世友), Dharmatrāta (Fajiu 法救) and Ghoṣa (Miaoyin 
妙音) of the Sarvāstivāda school (sapoduo 薩婆多), the *Sammitīya school (zhengliang 
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I am not able to give here a precise survey of these detailed discus-
sions, but Kuiji’s exposition is fascinating, inasmuch as it is, to some 
extent, certainly based on contemporaneous philosophical development 
in India, that is, on information most probably stemming from Xuan-
zang’s oral instruction.38 However, at the same time, we should not 
overlook the Chinese flavor of his exposition. I want to draw special 
attention to one point: Kuiji reports that Indian followers of the Mahāyā-
na take xianliang as a tatpuruṣa compound, construing xianliang as yi xian 
zhi liang (依現之量), “measure (liang) which is based on the actual 
(xian)”.39 Throughout the same discussion, Kuiji paraphrases “measure-
[ment]” (liang) by “mensuration” (liangdu), and explains the meaning of 
“the actual (xian)” as “the sense organ (gen 根)”.40 The first point is in 
line with the view expressed in the She dasheng lun chao, and the second 
point is probably based on Xuanzang’s own view, which was based on the 
pramāṇa-tradition founded by Dignāga.  
These points reveal without any doubt that Kuiji takes xian and liang 
as a compound(!) consisting of two elements, and understands xian as 
-------------------------------------------------- 
bu 正量部), Sautrāntika (jingbu shi 經部師), the Vaiśeṣika school (feishishi jia 吠世史
迦), the Sāṃkhya school (shulun shi 數論師) and the Mahāyāna school (dasheng shi 大
乘師). Therefore, it is evident that Kuiji uses the term xianliang as an Indic word, 
referring to the Indian context, and not as a Chinese word. 
38 For example, parallel discussion regarding differences of opinion between Vasumitra, 
Dharmatrāta and Ghoṣa is found in Xuanzang’s translation of the Mahāvibhāṣā (Da 
piposha lun 大毘婆沙論, T27:1545.61c, 63b, 489c).  
39 The explanation “yi X zhi Y”, as in yi xian zhi liang (依現之量), signifies that the term 
X-Y is a tatpuruṣa compound. This point is clear from Kuiji’s exegesis. In his Cheng 
weishi lun shuji (成唯識論述記), Kuiji explains yiye (意業 for Skt. manaskarman) as yi yi 
zhi ye (依意之業), stipulating that it is a tatpuruṣa compound (yishi shi, 依士釋) (T43:
1830.276a3). Regarding this, see also n. 44 below. Further, some texts explain that 
yanshi (眼識 for Skt. cakṣurvijñāna) is a tatpuruṣa compound by using the expression yi 
yan zhi shi (依眼之識; e.g., Kuiji’s expression “…依主釋…如眼識等…依眼之識，故名眼
識” in T43:1830.377b24-26) or yan zhi shi (眼之識) without resorting to yi (依) in the 
same sense (e.g., Kuiji’s expression “(彼云如)眼之識故名眼識” in T43:1830.416b
10-11). 
40 See Kuiji’s passage in n. 36 above. 
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corresponding to pratyakṣa, and liang to pramāṇa.41 We know this because 
reference to a kind of compound makes sense only if the word xianliang is 
interpreted as a single compound noun. It looks as though Kuiji assumed 
an underlying form such as *pratyakṣapramāṇa, as a single compound.  
Now, such a form is not attested in any Sanskrit Buddhist texts on 
pramāṇa: we have many examples of pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam as two nouns, 
but, as far as I know, the form *pratyakṣapramāṇa as a tatpuruṣa com-
pound is unattested. On the other hand, Kuiji’s statement does not make 
sense if we assume that the form pratyakṣa was the compound Kuiji 
meant, for in that case, we cannot find any reason why he would add the 
interpretation(s) of pramāṇa (liang). Thus, we might suppose that Kuiji is 
mixing up two different things: the analysis of pratyakṣa (< prati+akṣa) 
and the analysis of xianliang (< xian+liang). I do not mean that Kuiji’s en-
deavor is nonsense. Rather, I would like to see this complicated exegesis 
as a new idea, which makes sense only in the Chinese language, and not 
in Sanskrit. If this is the case, we have here an example of the “sini-
fication” of Buddhist terms. 
Another interesting interpretation of the above-mentioned passage, 
common to the Nyāyapraveśa and the Nyāyamukha, is found in Jingyan’s 
(淨眼) commentary entitled Yinming ru zhengli lun hou shu (因明入正理
論後疏, Pelliot chinois No. 2063). This text was edited by Takemura 
Shōhō (武邑尚邦) and subsequently studied by Shen Jianying (沈劍英).42 
-------------------------------------------------- 
41 Against my interpretation, some people might claim that Kuiji used the term yi xian zhi 
liang only to explain the Chinese word xianliang, and that it had nothing to do with the 
explanation of the Skt. term *pratyakṣapramāṇa. However, I do not think that this idea 
is tenable, because, as I pointed out in n. 37 above, in the case of his commentary on 
the Twenty Stanzas, Kuiji did not intend to explain a Chinese scholarly situation – i.e., 
how Chinese scholar-monks construed the Chinese word xianliang – but rather, 
introduced various Indian interpretations, referring to the word yi xian zhi liang as a 
Mahāyānic interpretation current in India. This implies that Kuiji tried to analyze the 
relationship between xian and liang in the Indian context, namely, in terms of the 
relationship between pratyakṣa and pramāṇa in the Sanskrit language. In fact, however, 
we do not find this type of discussion attested in extant Sanskrit texts. All that we can 
actually confirm is that there existed different interpretations of the relationship 
between praty- (prati) and akṣa, as shown, for example, in Sharma, 1985 and Taber, 
2005: 191 n. 71. 
42 Takemura, 1986: 300-301 (Yang/Xiao, 2008: 270-271); Shen, 2008: 281-282; cf. 136-138.  
54 Funayama  
 
According to Takemura, Jingyan is a commentator who lived between 
Wengui (文軌, d.u.) and Huizhao (慧沼, d. 714).43 Regarding the latter, 
Wei Jen Teng (Teng, 2011: 117) has recently pointed out that Huizhao 
explains that xianliang is a tatpuruṣa compound in his Dasheng fayuan lin 
zhang bu que (大乘法苑林章補闕) 8.44 
Jingyan first introduces the three interpretations of the passage in 
question already mentioned. Though I cannot describe them all here, the 
second interpretation is similar to Kuiji’s, construing xianliang as a tat-
puruṣa compound. The phrase yi xian zhi liang appears in that context.45 
According to the third interpretation, the term xianliang should be inter-
preted as a karmadhāraya compound (chiye shi 持業釋), in the sense that 
xian itself is liang.46 After introducing these different types of interpre-
tation, Jingyan further proceeds to present his own view (jin jie 今解) in 
two ways: namely that it can be either a tatpuruṣa- or a karmadhāraya 
compound. Here we can see a further development in interpretation. 
Next, in the second half of the eighth century, Tankuang (曇曠) com-
posed the Dasheng bai faming men lun kaizong yiji (大乘百法明門論開宗義
記) at Dunhuang.47 In this work, he describes the meaning of xianliang as 
follows: 
What is called “measurement regarding the eight kinds of conscious-
ness” is of three kinds in total. The first is “direct measurement”. “Di-
-------------------------------------------------- 
43 Takemura, 1986: 36. 
44 “The compound [is analyzed as follows:] An object [of the mind] is called xian. The 
mind is called liang. It is the liang regarding that xian. [Therefore] it is called xianliang. 
It is a tatpuruṣa compound.” (合釋者。若境名現，心名為量，即現之量，名為現量，
依主釋也, Z1, 2, 3, 1, 30, verso, b8-10; X55:882.159b22-23). 
45 “Namely [because it is] the liang which is based on the xian, it is called xianliang. This is 
a tatpuruṣa compound” (此即依現之量，名為現量。即依仕釋; Takemura, 1986: 300 
[Yang/Xiao, 2008: 270]). See also n. 39 above. The character shi (仕) here is used as a 
synonym of shi (士). This interpretation is shared by Kuiji. Apart from this basic point 
regarding the analysis of the compound, however, the actual contents of their views 
differ very much.  
46 “Namely, [because] xian is none other than liang, it is called xianliang. This is a 
karmadhāraya compound” (此即現即是量，名為現量。即持業釋也; Takemura, 1986: 
300 [Yang/Xiao, 2008: 271]). 
47 Ueyama, 1990: 20-23. 
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rect” (or “real”, xian 現) means that which is really existent in front 
of one (xianqian 現前). “Measurement” (liang) means “mensuration” 
(liangdu). That is to say, when colors and so forth are clear and 
determinate and directly exist in front of one, one is not deluded by 
an erroneous form, attains a determinate cognition, and is free from 
the conception of various designations, species and classes, [thus] 
illuminating [the object] clearly. Therefore this is called “direct 
measurement”. It is “direct”, on the one hand, and at the same time it 
is “measurement”, on the other. [Hence] it is an action-carrying 




Tankuang construes the term as a karmadhāraya compound, and states 
that xian means xianqian 現前, “(that which is) before one[’s eyes]”, 
which is a vividly manifesting, non-erroneous object of cognition; and 
that liang means liangdu “mensuration”.  
Thus, Chinese scholar-monks developed the interpretation of the 
term xianliang by considering the relationship between xian and liang. 
This viewpoint would not have been possible in Sanskrit literature, be-
cause *pratyakṣapramāṇa is not a common compound, even if it is not 
entirely impossible; and because the normal form pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam 
is not a compound at all.  
Finally, let me introduce a Chinese attempt to associate xianliang as 
pramāṇa with the teaching of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Such an idea is found 
in the commentary entitled Lengqie abaduoluo bao jing xuan yi (楞伽阿跋
多羅寶經玄義), composed by Zhixu (智旭, 1599-1655). Very interesting-
ly, this important monk of the Ming-Qing period explicates the meaning 
of xianliang in yet another way: 
What is called “direct measurement” [means the following:] “Direct” 
means direct manifestation. “Measurement” means amount. This im-
plies that, regarding all entities such as the five entities, the three 
kinds of intrinsic nature, the eight kinds of consciousness, the two 
kinds of no-self, and so on, to [as many as] ten realms (jie 界), a hun-
dred realms, or a thousand, all of these various entities [that are men-
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tioned in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra] are, as a whole, nothing but what is 
directly manifested (xianxian 顯現) by one’s own mind, and do not go 
beyond [what the mind can] discern and measure (fenliang 分量). 
Therefore it is called “direct measurement (xianliang 現量)”. 
(言現量者，現謂顯現，量謂分量。言一切五法三自性八識二無我，
乃至十界百界千，如等種種諸法，總是唯心所現，不出心之分量，
故名為現量也, Z1,1,26,1, 49, recto, b15-18; X17:328.484b.) 
Here, Zhixu states that xian signifies “directly manifest” (xianxian 顯現) 
as a verb, and liang means “[what the mind can] discern and measure” 
(fenliang 分量) as a noun. As a whole, he claims, the term xianliang 
signifies that all the mental categories, such as the five entities (pañca-
dharma), the three natures, and so forth, are nothing but the mani-
festation of one’s own mind, and they all remain within the scope of the 
mind. Although similar wording regarding xian in the sense of xianxian 
had existed previously,48 such a combination of pramāṇa theory and 
Mind-Only theory is a unique result of the Chinese Buddhist exegetical 
tradition, and cannot be found in Indian literature. We should also bear 
in mind that the idea developed here has a special connotation because, 
as a commentator on the Laṅkāvatāra, Zhixu needed to integrate the ten-
ets of this sūtra with the notion of pramāṇa. His unique exegesis of liang 
as fenliang is influenced by the notion of liang, which is a translation of 
Skt. mātra in the sūtra in question (as we saw above).  
Conclusion 
In the Six Dynasties period, pratyakṣa was translated by various words, 
such as xian, xianqian, xianjian, zheng, and so forth. The earliest reference 
to xianliang meaning “direct perception” is found in the Huizheng lun (Skt. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
48 See, for example, passages in the Zongjing lu (宗鏡録 49) compiled by Yanshou (延壽, 
904-975) (T48:2016.703a17-21), and Baochen’s (寶臣) commentary Zhu Dasheng ru 
Lengqie jing (注大乘入楞伽經 4) (T39:1791.459a15-17). However the chronological 
sequence of these passages, as well as their sources, are not clear to me. See also 
Zhengshou’s (正受, fl. ca. 1200) commentary Lengqie jing jizhu (楞伽經集註 2) (Z1, 1, 
25, 4, 325, verso, a11-13; X17:324.246c). 
 Chinese Translations of Pratyakṣa 57 
 
Vigrahavyāvartanī) of Nāgārjuna, in which xianliang is a translation of 
pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, and not pratyakṣa as a single word. Soon thereafter, 
at the end of the Six Dynasties period, the Dilun school started to use 
xianliang as a technical term.  
This is probably what influenced Xuanzang’s usage of xianliang. He 
employed it alternately as a translation of both pratyakṣa and of praty-
akṣaṃ pramāṇam.49 To put it another way, the term xianliang has a double 
meaning in Xuanzang’s translations, and without consulting the original 
Sanskrit text, it is impossible to determine in which of these two senses 
each instance of xianliang is being used.  
We also saw that it is hard to imagine that any term like *praty-
akṣapramāṇa, as a single compound, prevailed in the Indian Buddhist 
world. In Sanskrit texts, the most popular form is undoubtedly praty-
akṣaṃ pramāṇam, i.e. two words in apposition. Though I hesitate to say 
that the form *pratyakṣapramāṇa never existed in Sanskrit, even if, hypo-
thetically, the term did exist, I do not think it would be possible to 
regard such a compound as a tatpuruṣa, for as long as *pratyakṣapramāṇa 
is intended as a synonym of pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, the compound would 
have to be a karmadhāraya.  
However, after Xuanzang, Chinese scholar-monks began to analyze 
the meaning of xianliang by dividing it into xian and liang, and in so doing, 
they made use of their knowledge of classes of Sanskrit compounds like 
tatpuruṣa and karmadhāraya. The results of their analyses look somewhat 
unacceptable to the eyes of anyone familiar with Sanskrit grammar, be-
cause these Chinese scholars conflated the construction of xianliang with 
that of *pratyakṣapramāṇa. However, it would not be correct to criticize 
their views only with reference to Indian modes of analysis, because 
these Chinese monks used the Chinese language and thought in Chinese.  
Here, we should bear in mind that Chinese scholar-monks after 
Xuanzang applied such terms as yishi shi (tatpuruṣa) or chiye shi (karma-
-------------------------------------------------- 
49 As pointed out on p. 40, an evident example of xianliang in the sense of pratyakṣaṃ 
pramāṇam is found in Xuanzang’s translation of the Viṃśikā/Viṃśatikā: yiqie liang zhong, 
xianliang wei sheng (一切量中，現量為勝; Skt. sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ pratyakṣaṃ pra-
māṇaṃ gariṣṭham iti).  
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dhāraya) to Chinese terms or Chinese translations, and not directly to 
original Sanskrit terms or their phonetic transcriptions. Under such 
circumstances, earlier monks such as Kuiji probably had sufficient 
knowledge of the Sanskrit equivalents of the Chinese words they ana-
lyzed, while later - for example, in the Ming - scholar-monks no longer 
had any interest in, or knowledge of, the original Sanskrit terms, nor of 
the relationship between a Chinese translation and its Sanskrit equi-
valent. This implies that many of these later figures just applied Sanskrit 
words such as yishi shi or chiye shi to the explanation of Chinese terms in 
the Chinese context. In other words, they used the names of Sanskrit 
compounds to talk about the Chinese language. This being the case, it 
would be beside the point or meaningless to ask whether such Chinese 
interpretations make sense from a Sanskrit point of view. Rather than 
harshly criticizing those Chinese views, it would be better to take them 
differently; such Chinese interpretations look extremely attractive when 
we view them in a different light, as a matter of the Chinese language.  
It is almost meaningless to say, on the basis of Indic language, that the 
Chinese way of understanding xianliang was a mistake. Rather, it can be 
evaluated as a new type of development. In this sense it is an interesting 
example of what is called the “Sinification of Buddhist Concepts”.50  
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